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IAMBLICHUS OF CHALCIS AND HIS SCHOOL 
JOHN DILLON 
ι LIFE AND WORKS 
The sources available for our knowledge of Iamblichus' life are highly unsatis­
factory, consisting as they do primarily of a hagiographical and ill-informed Life 
by the sophist Eunapius, who was a pupil of Chrysanthius, who was himself 
a pupil of Iamblichus' pupil Aedesius; nevertheless, enough evidence can be 
gathered to give a general view of his life-span and activities. 
The evidence points to a date of birth around 245, in the town of Chalcis-ad-
Belum, modern Qinnesrin, in northern Syria. Iamblichus' family were promi­
nent in the area, and the retention of an old Aramaic name (yamliku-[El]) in the 
family points to some relationship with the dynasts of Emesa in the previous 
centuries, one of whose family names this was. This noble ancestry does seem 
to colour somewhat Iamblichus' attitude to tradition — he likes to appeal on 
occasion for authority to 'the most ancient of the priests' (e.g., De an. §37), and 
was plainly a recognized authority on Syrian divinities (cf. Julian, Hymn to King 
Helios i50cd). 
As teachers, Eunapius provides (VP 457—8) two names: first, a certain Ana-
tolius, described as 'second in command' to the distinguished Platonic philoso­
pher Porphyry, the pupil of Plotinus, and then Porphyry himself. We are left 
quite uncertain as to where these contacts took place, but we may presume in 
Rome, at some time in the 270s or 280s, when Porphyry, on his return from 
Sicily, had reconstituted Plotinus' school (whatever that involved). If that is so — 
and it is plain that Iamblichus knew Porphyry's work well, even though he was 
far from a faithful follower — then it seems probable that he left Porphyry's circle 
long before the latter's death, and returned to his native Syria (probably in the 
290s) to set up his own school, not in his home town, but rather in the city 
of Apamea, already famous in philosophical circles as the home of the second-
century Pythagoreanizing Platonist Numenius. There he presided over a circle 
of pupils, including a local grandee, Sopater, who seems to have supported him 
materially, and as long as Licinius ruled in the East, the school flourished. After 
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the triumph of Constantine, however, the writing had to be on the wall for 
such an overtly Hellenic and theurgically inclined group, and on Iamblichus' 
death in the early 320s the school broke up, his senior pupil Aedesius moving to 
Pergamum, where the Iamblichean tradition was carried on quietly for another 
generation or so. The Emperor Julian, we may note, sought to take on Aedesius 
as his mentor, but Aedesius, preferring the quiet life, prudently directed him to 
his own pupil Maximus of Ephesus. 
Iamblichus was a prolific author, though unfortunately only his more elemen-
tary works survive intact — apart from the Reply to the Letter of Porphyry to Anebo 
(popularly known, since the Renaissance, as On the Mysteries of the Egyptians). 
Chief among these was a sequence of nine, or possibly ten, works in which he 
presented a comprehensive introduction to Pythagorean philosophy — an indi-
cation of his view of Pythagoras as the spiritual grandfather of Platonism. Of 
these, we still have the first four, beginning with a Bios Pythagorikos — not simply 
a 'life of Pythagoras', but rather an account of the Pythagorean way of life, with 
a biography of Pythagoras woven into it — and followed by an Exhortation to 
Philosophy, a treatise On the General Science of Mathematics, and a commentary 
on the Introduction to Arithmetic of the second-century Platonist Nicomachus of 
Cerasa. The doxographical portion of a treatise On the Soul, and extracts from 
a series of philosophical letters, the most philosophically significant being the 
Letter to Macedonius on Fate, also survive in the Anthology of John of Stobi. 
Other than those, however, we have considerable evidence of commentaries 
on works of both Plato and Aristotle, fragments of which survive (mainly) in 
the later commentaries of Proclus. We have evidence of commentaries on the 
Alcibiades, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Sophist, Philebus, Timaeus and Parmenides of Plato, 
and the Categories of Aristotle (this latter preserved extensively by Simplicius), 
as well as the De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics, De caelo and De anima. He is 
also on record as having composed a copious commentary on the Chaldaean 
Oracles (in at least twenty-eight books), and a Platonic Theology. The Reply to the 
Letter of Porphyry to Anebo mentioned above is an odd production, consisting of 
a response to a polemical open letter by Porphyry attacking the practice and 
theory of theurgy, which Iamblichus, taking on the persona of a senior Egyptian 
priest, Abammon, elects to defend. 
2 PHILOSOPHY 
Iamblichus' philosophical position is essentially an elaboration of the Platonic 
system propounded by Plotinus (and Porphyry), though strongly influenced by 
such sources as the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha and the Chaldaean Oracles. He 
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accepts the triadic system of principles, or hypostases, the One, Intellect and 
Soul, propounded by Plotinus, but he introduces complications at every turn. 
First of all, in an attempt to resolve the contradiction between a One which 
is utterly transcendent but which also constitutes the first principle of all cre­
ation, he postulates a totally ineffable first Principle above a more 'positive' (i.e., 
causally efficient) One, which itself presides over a dyad of Limit and Unlimit-
edness, thus distinguishing the two antithetical aspects which Plotinus sought to 
embrace in his concept of the One. This we learn from a passage of Damascius' 
De principiis (§43, 2.1.iff. C—W), in which he tells us that Iamblichus set out 
such a system in his Chaldaean Theology: 
After this let us bring up the following point for consideration, whether the first prin­
ciples (archai) before the first noetic triad are two in number, the completely ineffable 
(hi pantë arrhëtos), and that which is uncoordinated (asuntaktos) to the triad, even as the 
great Iamblichus maintained in book 28 of his sublime Chaldaean Theology; or rather, as 
the majority of those who came after him preferred, that after the ineffable and single 
causal principle there comes the first triad of the intelligibles; or are we to descend even 
from this hypothesis and say, following Porphyry, that the single first principle of all is 
the Father of the intelligible triad? (My trans.) 
There are a number of problems here which need to be teased out. First of all, 
it seems at first sight odd of Damascius to make a contrast between a principle 
which is 'completely ineffable' and one that is unco-ordinated with a following 
triad. One would expect the second principle to be co-ordinated with what 
follows it. However, the oddity is explained by what follows. Those who come 
after Iamblichus, notably Syrianus and Proclus, accept the completely ineffable 
first principle, but make their second One the monad of a primary triad, rather 
than distinguishing between it and the monad ofthat triad. Iamblichus preferred 
to preserve a distinction here, for reasons which Damascius gives in what follows 
(2.11—3.2): this second One needs to be able to preside over both Limit and 
Unlimitedness, and to serve as 'the cause of the mixture', as portrayed at Phlb. 
23 cd, so it cannot itself be identical with the monad, which represents Limit. 
We must presume that Syrianus and Proclus viewed the situation otherwise, 
and preferred to subsume the causative element into the monad itself; but we 
can at least appreciate Iamblichus' concern to have his One preside over both 
elements of this pair equally. 
At any rate, Limit and Unlimitedness in turn generate a third principle, the 
Unified (to hênomenon), which constitutes an ontological link with the next 
hypostasis, that of Intellect (Nous), as whose highest element it can also be 
viewed. Inhering in the Unified we may also discern a multiplicity of'henads', 
which serve as unitary préfigurations of the system of Forms which are the 
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contents of Intellect. What, one might ask, is the justification for postulating 
such préfigurations of the Forms, which are themselves, after all, thoroughly 
unified within Intellect? One stimulus may be discerned as being a concern 
for what E. R. Dodds, with reference to Proclus, has termed 'the principle of 
continuity', requiring that reality should exhibit no sudden leaps, as from unity 
to multiplicity. This leads to the postulation of a succession of intermediate 
entities, and such is certainly the role filled by the henads. 
The origin of the concept of henads has actually been a matter of dispute, as 
between Iamblichus and the later Athenian school, but the remarks of Proclus in 
his Commentary on the Parmenides (6.1066, i6ff. Cousin), as part of his critique of 
previous interpretations of the subject matters of the hypotheses of the second 
part of the Parmenides, seem clear enough (he is criticizing Iamblichus under 
the guise of 'some of those we revere'). Iamblichus has just been presented as 
postulating the subject of the First Hypothesis as 'God and the gods': 
Necessarily then, if indeed the divine is above being, and all that is divine is above being, 
the present argument [sc. the First Hypothesis] could be either only about the primal 
God, who is surely the only entity above being, or else it is about all the gods also who 
are after him, as some of those we revere would hold. So they argue that since every god, 
inasmuch as he is a god, is a henad (for it is this element, the One, which divinizes all 
being), for this reason they think it right to join to the consideration of the First God 
the discussion of all the gods; for they are all supra-essential henads, and transcend the 
multiplicity of beings, and are the summits of beings. (My trans.) 
The reference to the henads as 'gods' may seem confusing, since for 
Iamblichus, as for his successors, there are gods at the intelligible level also, 
but the reason is that all entities in the realm of the One are ipso facto divinized — 
as Proclus indeed specifies here. Other passages of Proclus, notably In Parm. 
7.36.8—28 Klibansky and Theol. Plat. 3.21, confuse the issue somewhat further 
by describing Iamblichus' 'gods' as noeta, 'objects of intellection'. This, how-
ever, only points up a basic, though somewhat confusing, feature of Iamblichus' 
metaphysics, namely that the lowest element of a higher hypostasis also serves, 
from a different perspective, as the highest element, or 'monad', of the next 
lower (cf. Iambi. In Tim. fr. 54 Dillon). Thus the Unified, whose contents are 
the henads, may also be viewed as the One-Existent, or hen on, which presides 
as monad over the realm of Intellect, and whose contents are described as 'the 
monads of the Forms' (cf. Iambi. In Phlb. fr. 4 Dillon), which may be taken as 
the henads qua objects of contemplation by Intellect, a contemplation which 
results in the unified multiplicity of the Forms within Intellect. Such is the 
complexity which the relatively simple metaphysical system of Plotinus has now 
attained, within a generation of his death. 
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The realm of Intellect, in its turn, also undergoes elaborate subdivision in 
Iamblichus' system, first into a triad of three 'moments' or aspects, Being, Life 
and Intellect proper, and then into a subordinate series of three triads (again, of 
Being, Life, Intellect) arising out of each of these. 
First there is a set of three triads of intelligible gods (noetoi theoi). This is 
followed by three triads of intelligible-intellective (noetoi kai noeroi) gods; and 
this in turn by a hebdomad of intellective gods, consisting of two triads and 
an entity termed the hupezökös, the 'membrane', a concept borrowed from the 
Chaldaean Oracles (on which, as we know, Iamblichus composed an extended 
commentary), which has the function of constituting a barrier between the 
spiritual and material worlds. It is at this third level, among the Intellective 
Gods, that the Demiurge, identified with Zeus, holds 'the third rank among 
the Fathers', that is to say, the first intellective triad, composed of Kronos, Rhea 
(who is strictly speaking a Mother!) and Zeus himself. The curious circumstance 
that the intellective divinities constitute not three triads, but a hebdomad, may 
have something to do with the fact that these gods constitute a paradigm for 
the heavenly gods, who form a hebdomad, the hupezökös performing a similar 
role to that of the Moon. 
Our source for this degree of elaboration, admittedly, is given by Proclus (In 
Tim. 1.308.18fr.) as an essay of Iamblichus' entitled On the Speech of Zeus in the 
Timaeus, which Proclus contrasts with the simpler scheme which Iamblichus 
presents in his Timaeus Commentary, but there seems no reason to believe that 
he is inventing this. Iamblichus thus becomes the ancestor of the complex 
system of the later Athenian school of Syrianus and Proclus. The impulse for 
such elaborations seems to stem from a consciousness of the complexity of the 
spiritual world, and of the many levels of divinity which inhabit it, but it may 
not be entirely fanciful to suggest that it was to some extent stimulated by the 
ever-increasing degree of complexity manifested in the imperial administrative 
system from the late third century on, following the reforms of Diocletian and 
his successors. 
Something should be said, in conclusion, of two features of the realm of 
Intellect, Eternity (Aion) and the Paradigm, which serve as elements binding 
the whole multiplicity together. For Iamblichus, Aion would seem to be simply 
to hen on, or the Monad of the noetic realm (or indeed, more properly, to aei on, 
cf. In Tim. fr. 29), in its capacity as measure, or structuring principle, for that 
realm, in the same way that, as we shall see, Time is the measure of the psychic 
realm. In fr. 64 of his Timaeus Commentary, à propos the exposition of his theory 
of transcendent Time, Iamblichus lists the various characteristics of Eternity, 
stressing its uniformity, infinity, simultaneity, and permanent presentness (to hen 
kai apeiron kai ëdë on kai homou pan kai en töi nun menon), in such a way as to 
bring out its archetypal position vis-à-vis Time. 
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As for the Paradigm (as the object of the Demiurge's contemplation), in a 
comment on Tim. 28c (= In Tim. fr. 35 Dillon), Iamblichus on the one hand 
identifies it with the highest element in the noetic world, 'Being Itself (auto 
to hoper on), which we may take as equivalent to One-Being, but on the other 
hand he is reported by Proclus (In Tim. 1.336.16fr. — Iambi. In Tim. fr. 36) as 
declaring it to inhere in the Demiurge, which may only, after all, be an assertion 
that the whole noetic world is subsumed into the Demiurge (cf. In Tim. fr. 34), 
insofar as he transmits it to the physical world (through the mediation of Soul) 
in the form of logoi. 
The realm of Soul, likewise, exhibits complexity in comparison with the 
system of Plotinus. Iamblichus makes a distinction between pure, or unpar-
ticipated, Soul (amethektos psuche), which serves as the Monad of the psychic 
realm, and participated Soul, which is in a way the sum-total of individual souls. 
Some individual souls, likewise, transcend any contact with body, while others 
are destined to be embodied, and even these descend into body on various 
different terms. The highest element of Soul, however, as we learn in In Tim. 
frs. 55 and 56, is linked to what is above it through participating in the lowest 
element of Intellect, participated (methektos) Intellect: 
The Soul participates in Intellect, insofar as it is intellectual (noera), and through it unites 
itself even to the Divine Intellect (sc. the summit of the intelligible world, to hen on); for 
by participating in Intellect, the Soul of the Universe (he tou pantos psuchè) ascends to 
the Intelligible. (Fr. 55) 
Thus is the Iamblichean universe bound together. In his exegesis of Tim. 
36c (in the fragments just mentioned), Iamblichus interprets the outer circle of 
which the soul is made up, the 'Circle of the Same', as actually referring to this 
participated Intellect. That implies, presumably, that, in cognizing an intelligible 
Form, one grasps the sameness linking individual things, which is a prerequisite 
for rational discourse. 
In his treatise On the Soul (cf. in particular §§6—7 Finamore and Dillon), 
Iamblichus sought to differentiate himself from his predecessors Plotinus, 
Amelius and Porphyry, on the issue of the relation of the soul with what is 
above it, postulating a less direct contact with Intellect and the One, and a 
corresponding need of theurgy, or 'sacramental' ritual, to secure personal sal-
vation. He may thus be reasonably accused of making Platonism much more 
of a religion, a characteristic which endeared him in particular to the Emperor 
Julian, a generation after his death. However, all he really seems to be objecting 
to is the distinctive postulate of Plotinus that an element of the human soul — 
or, arguably, the true human soul — 'remains above', that is, does not in fact 
lose contact with the intelligible realm. His objections to this are well set out 
by Proclus at In Tim. 3.334.3fr. (= Iambi. In Tim. fr. 87), in connection with 
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an exegesis of Tim. 43cd. Iamblichus is not being quite fair to Plotinus here, 
perhaps, but he professes to fail to see how, if the highest element of our souls 
actually remains impassive, we could not be cognizant of this: 
But if when the best part of us is perfect, then the whole of us is happy (eudaimon), what 
would prevent us all, the whole human race, from being happy at this moment, if the 
highest part of us is always enjoying intellection, and always turned towards the gods? If 
the intellect is this highest part, that has nothing to do with the soul. If it is part of the 
soul, then the rest of the soul must also be happy. (My trans.) 
We may note that Iamblichus has no objection to the idea that there may be 
an element within us which is in touch with the divine realm, so long as that is 
not postulated to be an element of the soul. Indeed, he himself postulates within 
us, not just an intellect, but even a correlate of the One, which he terms, the 
'One of the soul', or, using Chaldaean terminology, 'the flower of the intellect' 
(anthos tou nou) — presumably signifying the supreme element of intellect, which 
somehow also transcends it. We hear of this latter through Damascius (Princ. 
§70, 2.104.17fr.), who is quoting from Iamblichus' Commentary on the Chaldaean 
Oracles. Strictly speaking, this anthos tou nou is able to cognize only the highest 
element of the noetic realm, wherein lie the 'monads of the Forms', but that 
brings it close to the One. 
On the other hand, we have from Hermeias (In Phdr. 150.24fr. Couvreur = 
Iambi. In Phdr. fr. 6) his exegesis of Phaedrus 247c, where the issue is the correct 
identification of the 'helmsman' (kubernêtês) of the soul. Here Iamblichus feels 
the need to make a distinction between the 'helmsman' and the 'charioteer', 
and, since the charioteer is plainly the intellectual element of the soul, the 
helmsman must be something else: 
The divine Iamblichus takes the 'helmsman' as being the One of the soul; its intellect 
is the charioteer. The term 'spectator' (theatês) is used not to signify that it directs its 
gaze on this object of intellection as being other than it, but that it is united with it and 
appreciates it on that level. This shows that the 'helmsman' is a more perfect entity than 
the charioteer and the horses; for it is the essential nature of the One of the soul to be 
united with the gods. (My trans.) 
This identification of the helmsman with a special 'one-like' faculty of the 
soul implies that the 'realm above the heavens' (huperouranios topos), in which 
True Being is to be viewed is not just the intelligible world, as intended by 
Plato, but rather the realm of the One. That is an unnatural interpretation of 
the text, but one possible for a Platonist to make, if one distinguishes it from 
the realm in which the heavenly ride of the myth takes place (248a ff.), during 
which the charioteer (not the helmsman) views the Forms. At any rate, that 
is how Iamblichus is taking it, and for the grasping of it he must postulate 
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a special faculty of the soul, which would be a source of non-cognitive, or 
supra-cognitive, contact with the One. 
Nonetheless, it is Iamblichus' view that the essence of the soul is quite distinct 
from that of the intellect. His position emerges forcefully in what remains of his 
treatise On the Soul (e.g., §7), and in certain passages of Pseudo-Simplicius (very 
probably Priscianus), In De anima, which reports his views. What emerges 
from these latter passages (e.g., In De an. 5.38—6.17; 89.33—90.25) is that 
Iamblichus postulated a truly hybrid essence for the soul. According to the latter 
passage: 
But if, as Iamblichus thinks, a distorted and imperfect activity cannot proceed from an 
impassible and perfect substance, the soul would be affected somehow even in its essence. 
Thus also in this way it is a mean not only between the divisible and indivisible, or what 
remains and what proceeds, or the intellective and the irrational, but also between the 
ungenerated and the generated. It is ungenerated in accordance with its permanent, 
intellectual and indivisible aspect, while it is generated in accordance with its procession, 
divisibility and association with the irrational; it possesses neither its ungenerated aspect 
purely, as an intellectual entity does, since it is not indivisible or permanent, nor its 
generated aspect as the lowest entities do, since these never completely exist. (Trans. 
Finamore and Dillon) 
This goes on some way further, driving home Iamblichus' very distinctive 
view of the soul's median position. The basis of his dispute with Plotinus is 
not a belief that we cannot attain enlightenment and union with the gods, but 
rather that we do not start with one foot, so to speak, still in the higher world; 
we must work our way up to it the hard way, with the help of theurgy, as it is 
not, strictly speaking, with our soul that we attain this union, but with some 
higher faculty, the activation of which requires theurgic intervention. 
Within the realm of Soul, two salient features which must be noted are Time 
and Space. On both Iamblichus has distinctive views, relayed to us mainly by 
Simplicius in his Commentary on the Physics, but also by Proclus (= Iambi. In 
Tim. frs. 62—8 for Time; fr. 90 for Space). Iamblichus postulates, as a principle 
governing all particular manifestations of time, what he terms 'transcendent 
Time' (exëirëmenos chronos) as the immediate image of Eternity in the psychic 
realm. He defines it as 'that which contains and orders the measures of all 
motion within the cosmos' (fr. 63, from Simplicius), and, in a phrase which 
caught the attention of Proclus also (fr. 64), 'an order — but not in the sense 
of being ordered, rather of ordering' (taxis. . . ou mentoi hë tattomenë, alla hë 
tattousa). As for Space, he defines it (fr. 90, from Simplicius) as 'a corporeal 
power which supports bodies and forces them apart and gathers them up when 
they fall and collects them together when they are scattered, at once completing 
them and encompassing them about from all sides'. Between them, Time and 
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Space serve as the basic conditions which distinguish the realm of Soul from 
that of Intellect above it. All that is distinctive to Iamblichus here, perhaps, is 
the postulation of a transcendent Monad of Time, to act as the psychic correlate 
of Eternity. 
It is significant, perhaps, that alone among post-Plotinian Platonist exegetes, 
Iamblichus does not choose to situate Soul in the third hypothesis of the Par-
menides (cf. In Parm. fr. 2), but places there what he terms 'the higher classes' (of 
being) — ta kreittona gene — comprising angels, daimones and heroes, as needing 
to be found a place in the scheme of things following on Intellect and prior to 
Soul. Soul he apportions between the fourth and fifth hypotheses, the fourth 
concerning rational souls, the fifth 'those secondary souls which are woven 
onto (proshuphainomenai) rational souls' — a view of the lower, or irrational, soul 
which in fact brings him close to Plotinus. 
In this connection, we may note Iamblichus' doctrine of the vehicle (ochëma) 
of the soul, which is quite distinctive (cf. In Tim. fr. 81), though he is not 
necessarily the originator of the concept as such (there is some evidence for 
its featuring, in at least some form, in the thought of some second-century 
Platonists, such as Atticus and Albinus: Proci. In Tim. 3.234.9fr.), and it was 
certainly a doctrine of Porphyry before him. This concept addresses the problem 
of the mode of contact between soul and body. Its relation to the irrational 
soul (alogos psuche) is somewhat fluid, but it is best seen, perhaps, as a sort of 
'receptacle' for the 'irrational' functions of the soul (including the passions, 
sense-perception, and even phantasia, or the image-forming capacity). These 
Plotinus was unwilling on the one hand to situate within the soul proper, but 
on the other, he seems to have disliked the concept of the ochëma, and makes 
only indirect references to it (e.g., Enn. 3.6.5; 4.3.15). Porphyry recognizes 
it, but regards it as a composite made up of planetary influences picked up 
like 'tunics' (chitônes) during the soul's descent to embodiment through the 
heavenly spheres, and dissolving again into the spheres on the soul's reascent. 
Iamblichus, by contrast, is reported by Proclus (In Tim. 3.234, 32fr. = Iambi. In 
Tim. fr. 81) to have maintained the immortality of the ochëma, and its creation 
by the gods themselves, rather than just being formed by accretion from the 
heavenly bodies. It is less than clear what Iamblichus has in mind here, but 
it may be that he is asserting that the individual soul retains some archetypal 
form of 'lower' or sensory soul even in its disembodied state; otherwise we are 
driven to suppose that the ochëma is somehow 'parked' in the upper reaches 
of the cosmos, awaiting the return of its soul to incarnation. With the former 
alternative, however, we might see Iamblichus as postulating something like a 
Platonist equivalent of the Christian 'resurrection body', at least in the form 
that this doctrine was advanced by such theologians as Origen. 
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On the question of the soul's relation to the body, Iamblichus has a number 
of interesting things to say in his De anima. At §28. 379 Finamore and Dillon, 
he makes a distinction between the relation of higher souls to their bodies and 
those of human souls: 
The association of all souls with bodies is not the same. The All-Soul, as Plotinus also 
believes, holds in itself the body that is appended to it, but it is not itself appended to this 
body or enveloped by it. Individual souls, on the other hand, attach themselves to bodies, 
fall under the control of bodies, and come to dwell in bodies that are already overcome by 
the nature of the universe. The souls of gods adapt their bodies, which imitate intellect, 
to their own intellectual essence; the souls of the other divine classes direct their vehicles 
according to their allotment in the cosmos. Furthermore, pure and perfect souls come 
to dwell in bodies in a pure manner, without passions and without being deprived of 
intellection, but opposite souls in an opposite manner. (Trans. Finamore and Dillon) 
Who are these 'pure and perfect souls', one might ask? We have evidence here, 
in fact, of an interesting doctrine of Iamblichus, which he elaborates on just 
below, to the effect that there are fully three distinct modes in which classes of 
human soul relate to their bodies. The highest (and no doubt far the smallest) 
group are those who descend 'for the salvation, purification and perfection of 
this realm'; these are not polluted by their descent. This class, which would no 
doubt include such great teachers as Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, are strangely 
similar to the boddhisatvas of the Buddhist tradition. There had of course been 
a recognition previously, in Pythagorean and Platonist circles, that some souls, 
notably that of Pythagoras, were special, but such souls had not, so far as we 
know, been formalized into a class. 
The median class, comprising (presumably) the majority of embodied souls, 
has descended for the purpose of'exercise and correction of its own character' 
(dia gumnasian kai epanorthösin tön oikeiôn êthôn), implying, certainly, some degree 
of imperfection and past misbehaviour, but no great guilt; it is rather a portrayal 
of the normal human condition, as well as a recognition of the role of the 
physical cosmos as a necessary theatre for the moral and cognitive development 
of the human soul. Lastly, however, there is the class of those who are sent down 
here 'for punishment and judgement' (epi dikëi kai krisei), a category that may 
be postulated to explain the existence of apparently naturally evil and perverse 
individuals — a phenomenon addressed also by Plotinus in the course of his 
treatise On Providence 3.2—3 (cf. e.g., 3.2.4; 13). A similar three-way division is 
set out in Myst. 5.18: 
The great mass of men, on the one hand, is subject to the domination of nature, and is 
ruled by natural forces, and directs its gaze downwards towards the works of nature, and 
fulfils the decrees of fate, and takes upon itself the order of what is brought about by 
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fate, and always employs practical reasoning (praktikos logismos) solely about natural phe-
nomena. A certain few individuals, on the other hand, employing an intellectual power 
which is beyond the natural (huperphuei tini dunamei tou nou chrömenoi), have disengaged 
themselves from nature, and turned towards the transcendent and pure intellect, at the 
same time rendering themselves superior to natural forces. There are some, finally, who 
conduct themselves in the middle area between nature and pure mind, some following 
after each of them in turn, others pursuing a mode of life which is a blend of both, and 
others again who have freed themselves from the inferior level and are transferring their 
attention to the better. (Trans. Clarke, Dillon and Hershbell) 
These divisions are similar, as I say, to those in the De anima, but not identical. In 
particular, the lower two classes are presented somewhat differently, the lowest 
seeming here to comprise the general run of human beings, while the median 
class (here subdivided, oddly, into three sub-classes) seems to represent a class of 
intellectuals who, while not yet accomplished theurgists, are capable of moving 
in that direction; and no class is represented as seriously sinful. We may see here, 
perhaps, the outcome of a good deal of speculation, in later Platonist circles, as 
to the reasons for differences in moral and intellectual capacity between human 
beings. 
Apart from gods and mortal souls, the Iamblichean universe is replete with 
various grades of intermediate being, termed collectively ta kreittona gene, 'the 
superior classes (of being)', such as he saw as being the subject of the Third 
Hypothesis of the Parmenides. If we turn to his comprehensive discussion of 
the various grades of intermediate being in book 2 of the De mysteriis, we 
find first a broad distinction being made between daimones and heroes (2 .1-
2), which may perhaps owe something to the much earlier (and now lost) 
treatise of Posidonius On Daemons and Heroes. Iamblichus identifies daimones 
as representing 'the generative and creative powers of the gods', while heroes 
represent 'their life-giving powers, which are directive of human beings'. The 
contrast here seems to be between the bestowal of bare existence and that of 
life; at any rate, Iamblichus states that the powers of daimones extend further 
into the cosmos than those of heroes, who are concerned specifically with the 
organization of souls (he tön psuchön diataxis). 
This, however, is only a preliminary to a far more elaborate set of distinctions 
which he produces (2.3fr.), in response to a query of Porphyry's as to how to 
distinguish the epiphanies of the various classes of higher being. We are now 
presented with a succession of archangels, angels, daimones, heroes and two levels 
of sublunary archon, occupying the space between gods and men, each with 
their distinct essences, potencies and activities. 
To go into the details of these would be beyond the proper scope of this 
survey, but we should note another feature of Iamblichus' daimonology that is 
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distinctive, and which indeed seems to bring him near to certain Gnostic beliefs. 
We are informed by a scholion on Plato's Sophist (= Iambi. In Soph. fr. 1 Dillon) 
that Iamblichus held that the subject of the dialogue, that is to say, the Sophist, 
is the sublunary Demiurge. This being is portrayed as a figure who presides over 
the realm of nature, which he has created as a snare and delusion for souls who 
descend into it, but from which they can free themselves through philosophy 
and the exercise of dialectic (cf. Plotinus' exaltation of the role of dialectic in 
Enn. 1.3). To that extent he can be described not only as an 'image-maker' 
and 'sorcerer', but also as a 'purifier of souls' (kathartës psuchön). This figure 
may reasonably be assimilated to the 'greatest daemon' (megistos daimön) whom 
John Laurentius Lydus (De mens. 83.13 fr.) reports Iamblichus, in book 1 of his 
work On the Descent of the Soul (a work which doubtless elaborated on many 
of the themes that we have just been discussing), as placing over three tribes 
of sublunary daemons, and equating with Plouton or Hades. Here we find a 
somewhat different (though not necessarily incompatible) scheme to that set 
out in the De mysteriis: 
According to Iamblichus, the tribe of daimones below the moon is divided into three 
classes. Of these that nearest to the earth is punitive (timöron), that in the air is purificatory 
(kathartikon), and that nearest to the zone of the Moon is salvine (sôtërion) - this class 
we know also as heroes. All these are said to be ruled over by a certain supreme daimon, 
who is probably to be identified with Plouton. (My trans.) 
That this sublunary realm is in fact the realm of Hades/Plouton is a belief 
attested within Platonism as early as Xenocrates in the Old Academy (fr. 213 
Isnardi Parente), so that is not, as such, an innovation, but the equating of Hades 
with the Sophist, and the accompanying description of his modes of deception, 
may indeed be original to Iamblichus. 
An issue connected with the sublunary realm, and its relation to what is 
above it, is the doctrine of Fate, Providence and Free Will, and on this we may 
derive some enlightenment from various of Iamblichus' Letters, notably those to 
Macedonius, to Poemenius and to Iamblichus' own senior pupil Sopater. This 
topic, as Iamblichus sees it, primarily concerns the realm of Nature, which may 
be taken as that lower aspect of the World Soul which concerns itself with the 
generation and administration of the physical world. It is at this level that we 
find the sphere of operations of Fate (heimarmene). 
In the Letter to Macedonius (Letter 8 Dillon and Polleichner), we are faced 
to all appearances with a strictly determined world, on the Stoic model - as 
indeed one finds also in Plotinus (e.g., Enn. 3.2-3); but Iamblichus is also at 
pains to emphasize that the soul in itself insofar as it emancipates itself from 
worldly influences and concerns, 'contains within itself a free and independent 
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life' (fr. 2). This is in fact more or less in accord with the doctrine of Plotinus, 
who also holds that what is for him the 'higher' soul is free from the bonds 
of Fate, though it is really only free to assent to the order of the universe. For 
Iamblichus, Fate itself is dependent on Providence (pronoia), which is a benign 
force guiding the higher, intelligible realm, of reality. In fr. 4, their relationship 
is set out as follows: 
For indeed, to speak generally, the movements of Destiny (peprömene) around the cosmos 
are assimilated to the immaterial and intellectual activities and circuits, and its order 
is assimilated to the good order of the intelligible and transcendent realm. And the 
secondary causes are dependent on the primary causes, and the multiplicity attendant 
upon generation on the undivided substance, and the whole sum of things subject to 
Fate is thus connected to the dominance of Providence. In its very substance, then, Fate 
is enmeshed with Providence, and Fate exists by virtue of the existence of Providence, 
and it derives its existence from it and within its ambit. 
This is all expressed in fairly impersonal terms, as is also the case in the Letter to 
Sopater (Letter 12), but in the Letter to Poemenius (Letter 11), we actually find an 
assertion of the benign guidance of Fate by the gods, to an extent that seems to 
accord more with theology than philosophy: 
The gods, in upholding Fate, direct its operation throughout the universe; and this sound 
direction of theirs brings about sometimes a lessening of evils, sometimes a mitigation of 
their effects, on occasion even their removal. On this principle, then, Fate is disposed to 
the benefit of the good, but in this disposing does not reveal itself fully to the disorderly 
nature of the realm of generation. 
We seem to discern here a role, though that is not stated in the present context, 
for the operations of theurgy. 
We may now turn to a consideration of his ethical doctrines. Basically, 
Iamblichus does not deviate from the relatively austere, Stoicizing (as opposed to 
Peripateticizing) tendency in ethical theory advanced by Plotinus, and thereafter 
more or less universal in later Platonism, tending, for example, to the extirpation 
rather than the moderation of the passions, and advocating of 'assimilation to 
God' (homoiösis theöi) - presumably with the assistance of theurgy - as the pur-
pose (telos) of human life. In what remains of his Letters, we find many ethical sen-
timents expressed, on a relatively popular level, but there is little that is remark-
able. He writes to his senior disciple Sopater on Virtue, on Ingratitude, and on 
Bringing Up Children, to Asphalius on Wisdom (phronêsis), to the lady Arete on 
Moderation, to Anatolius on Justice, and to Olympius on Courage. In the last 
instance, we find him making a good Platonic distinction between courage 'in 
the strictest sense', which is constituted by 'the sameness and stable condition 
of the intellect in itself, and that courage which derives from this higher kind, 
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which is concerned with the control of the passions in the area of what is and 
what is not to be feared. This seems to owe something to Plotinus' distinction 
of higher and lower levels of virtue in Enn. 1.2, as well as to Plato's Laches. 
It is in fact Iamblichus' theory of the grades of virtue, itself merely a further 
elaboration of that propounded by Porphyry in Sent. §32, which constitutes 
perhaps his most distinctive contribution to late Platonic ethical theory. We 
learn of this from the so-called 'B' Commentary on the Phaedo, attributed to 
Damascius (113.14fr. Norvin). Iamblichus sets out a sequence of fully seven 
grades of virtue, amplifying Porphyry's four at either end. Prior to Porphyry's 
(and Plotinus') 'civic' level, he lists the 'natural' and the 'ethical', the former 
being those attributable to animals (e.g., lions are naturally courageous, storks 
just, and cranes wise), the latter to well-brought-up children and non-reflective 
adults; and, to cap Porphyry's highest level, the 'paradigmatic', Iamblichus pos-
tulates the 'hieratic', proper to the accomplished theurgist, who has attained 
union with the gods. In between these are the Porphyrian four levels, the civic, 
the purificatory, the theoretic and the paradigmatic. 
Iamblichus' contributions to the development of logic are not of great sig-
nificance, despite his composition of a commentary on Aristotle's Categories. 
He lavishes praise on the dialectic method in two letters, those to his pupil 
Dexippus (who himself composed a brief commentary on the Categories) and to 
Sopater, both On Dialectic, but in his commentary he is mainly concerned with 
defending Aristotle's coherence and correctness against the attacks of the earlier 
anti-Aristotelian Platonist tradition, including Plotinus in Enn. 6.1—3. The other 
salient characteristic of his exegesis of the Categories is what Simplicius terms 
his noera theoria, or 'transcendental interpretation', which essentially consists in 
trying to show that, contrary to what Plotinus would maintain, Aristotle's list 
of categories is true, in an analogical way, for all levels of reality. One example 
of this approach may suffice. It concerns Aristotle's assertion, at Cat. 4b20, that 
'of quantities, some are discrete, others continuous' (Simpl. In Cat. 135.8fr. = 
fr. 37 Larsen): 
Since the power of the One, from which all quantity derives, extends identically through 
all things, and demarcates each thing in its procession from itself, in so far as it penetrates 
totally indivisibly through all things, it generates the continuous, and in so far as it 
performs a single and indivisible procession without interval; whereas in so far as it halts 
in its procession at each of the forms and defines each and makes each of them one, 
in this aspect it produces the discrete. So in virtue of being the single dominant causal 
principle of these two activities it produces the two types of quantity. 
Such an interpretation of the Categories might well be said to pertain rather more 
to metaphysics than to logic proper, but, as we can see from various remarks in 
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his letters to Dexippus and to Sopater, Iamblichus sees logic, or at least dialectic, 
as very much a means of reconnecting us to the intelligible world, and even to 
the One. The opening section of his Letter to Sopater on Dialectic (fr. ι Dillon) 
makes his position clear: 
All men employ dialectic, since this power is innate in them from their earliest years, 
at least in some degree, though some have a larger share of it than others. Something 
that is a gift of the gods [cf. Phlb. 16c] should by no means be cast aside, but should 
rather be fortified by practice and experience and technical training. For behold how 
during one's whole life it continues to be outstandingly useful: in one's encounters with 
one's fellow-men, for addressing them in accordance with the common notions (koinai 
ennoiai) and opinions; in investigating in the arts and sciences, for discovering the first 
principles of each; for calculating, prior to each action, how one should proceed; and 
for providing marvellous methods of preliminary training for the various philosophical 
sciences. (My trans.) 
There is, of course, nothing particularly distinctive here. Iamblichus' position 
is very much a development ofthat taken up by Plotinus in Ennead 1.3; but it 
is an indication that logic was by no means neglected in the curriculum of his 
school. 
3 IAMBLICHUS' SCHOOL 
It is plain, from Eunapius' account, that when Iamblichus finally settled in 
Apamea, possibly under the patronage of his pupil Sopater, as mentioned earlier, 
quite a group of followers gathered round him, constituting what can reasonably 
be described as a school. It is even possible that the site of this school has been 
discovered by the current excavators of Apamea, in a large villa which boasts a 
fine mosaic of Socrates and the Seven Sages. At any rate, we learn from Eunapius 
(Vit. Soph. 458—9) that Iamblichus owned, or had the use of, more than one 
suburban villa. As to the school itself, we may quote Eunapius (ibid.): 
He had a multitude of disciples, and those who desired learning flocked to him from all 
parts. And it is hard to decide who among them was the most distinguished, for Sopater 
the Syrian was of their number, a man who was most eloquent both in discourse and 
in writing; and Aedesius and Eustathius from Cappadocia; while from Greece came 
Theodorus and Euphrasius, men of superlative virtue, and a crowd of other men not 
inferior in their powers of oratory, so that it seemed marvellous that he should satisfy 
them all. 
Apart from those mentioned here, we know of Dexippus, author of a short 
question-and-answer commentary on the Categories, to whom, as mentioned 
above, Iamblichus dedicates a letter, and whom Simplicius describes (In Cat. 
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2.25) as ho Iamblicheios; and a certain Hierius, teacher, along with Aedesius, of 
the notorious Maximus of Ephesus, one of Julian's chief gurus (Ammonius, 
In An. Pr. 31.16). The school in Apamea seems to have survived well enough 
as long as Licinius had control of the East (and indeed we have a series of 
interesting letters to Iamblichus, preserved among the letters of Julian, from an 
unknown former pupil who was on Licinius' staff), but after his defeat at the 
hands of Constantine in 324 it would seem that things became more difficult, 
and ultimately the school had to disperse. Sopater met a violent death in 326 
through going off to Constantinople and getting mixed up in imperial politics, 
and it was left to Aedesius to carry on after Iamblichus' death. He moved 
the school to Pergamum, where he doubtless felt more comfortable, and he 
was succeeded on his death by Eustathius. Eustathius was a correspondent of 
St Basil (Letter 1, dated 357), at which time we find him established at Caesarea 
in Cappadocia, though the letter refers to his travels to Egypt and even to Persia. 
We do not know how long the direct Iamblichean succession survived in Asia 
Minor, but more interesting, though still mysterious, is the question of what the 
link may have been between Iamblichus and the Athenian school of Plutarch, 
Syrianus and Proclus. There is on the one hand the figure of Theodorus of 
Asine (presumably the Theodorus from Greece mentioned by Eunapius), but 
he in later times became quite critical of Iamblichus (cf. Julian, Ep. 12 Bidez, 
to Priscus), establishing an allegiance rather to Plotinus' elder pupil Amelius, 
many of whose distinctive formulations he adopted. About Euphrasius we know 
nothing more, but the Priscus to whom Julian is writing in Letter 12 is a possible 
candidate for passing distinctively Iamblichean doctrines on to Plutarch, and so 
to Syrianus. At any rate, it is plain that for the Athenian School the most signif-
icant figure among their immediate predecessors was Iamblichus, both for his 
adoption of theurgy and for the greatly increased elaboration of his metaphysi-
cal scheme, which seemed to them to do justice to the true complexity of the 
intelligible world. As Proclus presents the situation, in his commentaries on the 
Timaeus and the Parmenides, the majority of Syrianus' distinctive exegetical posi-
tions are essentially elaborations of Iamblichean doctrines. Iamblichus may thus 
be regarded as the true father, for what that is worth, of later, post-Plotinian, 
Platonism. 
4 A NOTE ON THEURGY 
In the body of this chapter, the role of theurgical theory and practice in the 
thought of Iamblichus has been rather played down, as having, in my view, been 
in the past given too prominent a role in his philosophy, but it cannot at the 
same time be denied that Iamblichus himself accorded quite a prominent role 
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to the practice of rituals in ensuring the efficacy of philosophical speculation; 
and this after all reminds us that, for later Platonists, Platonism was a religion as 
well as a philosophical system. 
There is a notable passage in Iamblichus' De Mysteriis which makes the point 
well: 
Granting, then, that ignorance and deception are faulty and impious, it does not follow 
from this that the offerings properly made to the gods, and divine procedures (theia erga), 
are invalid, for it is not (primarily) intellectual activity (ennoia) that connects theurgists 
to the gods. Indeed what, then, would prevent those who are theoretical philosophers 
from enjoying theurgic union with the gods? In fact, however, the situation is quite 
otherwise: it is rather the correct performance of acts not to be divulged and beyond all 
conception, and the power of unutterable symbols, understood by the gods alone, that 
establishes theurgic union, (trans. Clarke, Dillon and Hershbell, lightly emended) 
There is no doubt something of a polemical edge to this pronouncement, and 
Iamblichus is making it in the guise of a senior Egyptian priest, but nonetheless 
it will serve well enough as a manifesto for the sort of 'sacramental theology' 
which Iamblichus thought it proper to embrace as an essential aspect of his 
philosophical system. As he is careful to specify to Porphyry, however (see his 
extended exposition in De My st. ι.ιι—12), the performance of such rituals is 
not to be taken as implying that the gods can in any way be constrained to do 
one's bidding — that is the pretension of 'vulgar' magicians. Rather, the gods, 
out of their infinite benevolence, are pleased to respond to rituals correctly 
performed, and performed with a suitably respectful attitude. Theurgy, in fact, 
is really a means of organizing the natural sympatheia of the world to concord 
with the benevolent providence of the gods. It may be viewed, therefore, as a 
sort of theologized science. 
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